



Academic Approach to Mitigating Insider Threats

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- The Insider Threat (IT) problem has recently received increased attention in the academic community
- Reasons for this include but not limited to:
 - the IT problem typically involves attacks carried out by trusted, as opposed to untrusted, employees.



- as technical security against outside attacks improve, access through compromised insiders becomes a more attractive alternative.
- losses due to insider attacks are significant and highly damaging.



Approach 1/2

- Academic programs
- **Research**
- Outreach



Approach 2/2

- Academic programs
 - Human Reliability in Nuclear systems
 - Radiation Measurements Laboratory
 - Physical security for - High Consequence facilities
 - Physical Vulnerability Assessment



Academic Programs 1/8

Human Reliability in Nuclear Systems

- Risk and Risk Mitigation
- Motivational factors
- Psychological characteristics
- Types of insiders – Case Studies



Academic Programs 2/8

- Behavioral observations
- Insider Table Top Exercises
- Terrorism
- Divided loyalty



Academic Programs 3/8

Radiation Measurements Laboratory

- Physics and electronics associated with radiation detection and measurement, methods of data analysis.
- Application of detector measurements and fundamentals of radiation detection instrumentation operation in the context of **detecting, identifying, and quantifying radioactive materials.**



Academic Programs 4/8

- Use of radiation detection systems in process monitoring and safeguards systems, and in monitoring for security applications.



Academic Programs 5/8

Physical security for High Consequence facilities

- Basis
 - The **threat exists** and nuclear security culture is important – NSS 7
 - Measures against possible insiders – NSS 8



Academic Programs 5/8

Physical security for High Consequence facilities

- Processes
 - Identify the Insider Threat Characteristics
 - Motivation, role, tools and time
 - Identify Potential Insider Scenarios
 - Theft, sabotage, transportation related, emergency situations, Hostage



Academic Programs 6/8

- Identify targets
 - Protracted or abrupt theft, disruption to operation, ease of access, cost of repair/replacement
- Mitigation
 - Detect
 - Delay
 - Response



Academic Programs 7/8

Physical Vulnerability Assessment

- vulnerability assessment process
- insider threat characteristics and behaviors
- controls available to reduce insider success



Research

NIRR-1

- Research Reactor
 - CIAE
 - HEU ~ 90%
 - 1 Kg; U-235
 - Education & Training, NAA, radioisotopes



HRP Development Strategy

- HRP policy document (the “why”)
- Scope document (who, what, when, and where)
- Program procedure
- Identify stakeholders
- EC
- IT



- “Why”
- Threats to nuclear facilities are real
- IT is a global issue
- Simply “people do bad things”
- Among over 45 countries intending to introduce nuclear power
- Emerging security threat
- High Consequence facility



- Protect
 - National security
 - Workers
 - Public
- Historical events
- Preserve the nuclear industry
- NSS 2014



- “Who”
 - Potential positions are based on a facility’s Vulnerability Analysis (VA)
 - Screening criteria (Job Task Analysis)
 - Afford access to the reactor hall and control room,
 - Have responsibilities for MC&A,
 - Afford access to information concerning vulnerabilities in the protective system in the reactor facility.



- Afford the potential to significantly impact on security or un-acceptable damage to NIRR-1 facility
 - Reactor manager
 - Reactor supervisor
 - Reactor operators (A)
 - Maintenance engineers
 - Health physics personnel
 - Security personnel
 - Office attendants
 - **Emergency response team**



- “What”
 - Security clearance
 - Background check
 - Education verification
 - Credit check
 - Work history verification
 - Arrest record/criminal history check
 - Signed releases, acknowledgments, and waivers



- Initial and **annual** HRP training
- Initial and random test for illegal drugs
- Initial and **annual** random alcohol test
- Supervisory Review
- Medical Assessment
 - Psychological/physical assessment
- Management Evaluation



- Security Review
- Training
- Removal from HRP
- Certification and **annual** recertification
- Roles and responsibilities
- Schedule



- “When”
- Time length for continuing evaluation of HRP

Responsibility	Initial	Annual	Every 3 Years	Random
Supervisory Review	X	X		
Medical Assessment	X	X		
Psychological Evaluations				
Interview	X	X		
Psychological Testing	X		X	
Management Evaluation	X	X		
Drug Testing	X	X		X
Alcohol Testing	X	X		X
Personnel Security Review	X	X		
HRP Instruction	X	X		



- “Where”
- HRP will be managed
 - Security is the prime responsibility of the operator
 - Oversight function by the regulatory authority



Program Procedure

- Elements, Objectives and measures of effectiveness
 - objectives met?
- Legal framework – competent authority



Outreach

- Promote Self-Sufficient Best Practices
- MOUs
- INSEN
- Partner with PNS
 - Workshops - Students – Fellowships – Visits



Challenges

- Resources
- Laboratory equipment
- HRP – Human reliability management program



Summary

- Educational programs is key to ensuring a strong nuclear security culture
- Academic Institutions will play a vital role in turning out SMEs for sustainability
- Research is key to developing new tools and methodology to mitigate against IT



Summary

- HRP
 - Enhances security awareness and education
 - Defines security responsibilities in the workplace
 - Evaluates the security status of individuals
 - Management commitment is essential
 - Legal framework is key for implementation
 - Vigilance and questioning attitude
- PNS has assistance programs



Thank you for Listening

